The advanced stealth fighter of Russia, known as Sukhoi Su-57, which NATO has called the “Felon,” reportedly conducted more than 40 attacks on the ground targets of Ukraine, according to Defence Blog. It has been massively spumed in usages for the Su-57, given that not much was seen of it before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
The UK Ministry of Defence had noted that the deployments of Su-57 on the battlefield have been very random in the initial months of the war, but that use has become highly frequent in the last few months. The aircraft has been reported to deliver cruise missile strikes, carrying Kh-69 out of Russian airspace.
Of course, despite all these recent activities, Russia still has a lot of problems with its ability to produce fresh units, with a minimal few reportedly now being delivered, and just how operational these newcomers will be is also yet to be determined to find out just how valid Russia’s recent claims have been.
Su-57 is now becoming more commonly used in Russia’s air campaign. This is based on missile strikes reported since late February 2024. According to Defence Blog, Su-57 was used to launch more than 30 cruise missiles among which are stealth cruise missiles Kh-69 to destroy small, well-protected targets at ranges greater than 180 miles.
One of the notable attacks was conducted on April 11, 2024, when one Kh-69 missile destroyed the Typillia Thermal Power Plant outside of Kyiv.
Confirmed to have been used against the power plant is the Kh-69 missile, which, besides being armed by the Su-34 and Su-35 tactical aircraft, can also be released from the Su-57. For this, since it was launched from outside of Ukrainian airspace, the effective reach of the Su-57 is confirmed.
Despite the growing use of the Su-57, its role in the war is still very minimal. Kyiv’s attempts to strike stealth fighters are indeed intense – where Ukrainian drones reportedly destroyed one of the pricey Russian warbirds on the ground at Akhtubinsk State Flight Test Center in southern Russia, 365 miles from the Russia-Ukraine border.
Moscow failed to mass-produce the Su-57. The current series of the serially produced fighters, which were handed over recently to the Aerospace Forces, happened to be barely two, or maybe three, fighters.
Recent photos spread on social media also point to the fact that these jets may not be fresh production but pieces that were left in the factory and then brought together in pieces.
The Kh-69 cruise missile, which is associated with the Su-57, has also been used in recent strikes. A Ukrainian military blogger published a photo on Telegram of the destroyed Kh-69, reportedly the result of a large-scale missile strike on February 7, 2024.
Its rear fins were identified and further information was given by the @war_monitor_ua account on X, which follows Russian military aviation activity. The account claimed that three Kh-69s had been launched against Ukraine overnight from February 7 to February 8, along with three Kh-59 standoff missiles. Out of the six missiles shot at Ukraine, five were reported to be destroyed while those hit the Poltava, Sumy, and Mykolaiv regions.
The Kh-69 is an air-launched land-attack cruise missile developed by Raduga with a minimum range of 300 km. The missile is designed to hit hardened targets with known coordinates and can be carried by various Russian aircraft, including MiG-29K, MiG-35, Su-30MK, Su-34, and Su-35. According to Sergey Serebryakov, the low-observable features of the Kh-69 missile enable it to fit inside the weapons bay of the Su-57.
Combat sightings of the Kh-69 over Ukraine indicate a growing Russian interest in deploying newly developed missiles to fight, though this remains within the overall pattern of the conflict of the other newly developed Russian missile types deployed, including the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile and the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile.
With these advanced weapons in Ukraine, Russia will be able to try them in grueling conditions of operations, master tactics, and straighten out the remaining problems.
Moreover, it points to the problems with the level of production output for high-tech weapons in Russia, especially in the absence of international sanctions.