A supposedly revolutionary armored warfare system now is widely seen as iconizing the problems of Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Its design is innovative, but the T-14 curiously remains absent from the front lines in Ukraine, throwing a shadow over any practicality and value for money.
According to the head of state corporation Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, T-14 is too pricey for Ukraine. He voiced the argument, stating that more significant features, such as an unmanned turret and an automated loading system, cannot be used in the current war.
The Russian military has opted to opt for modern T-90 tanks, stating there is a slightly more economical approach.
The T-14 not being present on the battlefield has many thinking it will not do well in practice. Mikhail Andreev, the Russian expert, believed that the vehicle mentioned was not suited for use in real war, though subjected to extreme conditions through the many varieties of weather that occurred in said testing.
The defining feature of the tank is an unmanned turret and detachable pod having allowed much doubt about these features’ usefulness in real battlefield settings.
This is the T-14 Armata, a new tank unveiled in 2015 and marking a paradigm shift from traditional tanks in the Soviet times. Its unmanned turret, controlled from an independent armored chamber, allows increased crew safety and better use of space.
It carries a 125 mm smoothbore cannon, and a 1,500 horsepower diesel engine, and holds a quite superior firepower, protection, and mobility system from its predecessors.
However, when it comes to the T-14 not being in Ukraine, that is a pretty good summary of the weaknesses of the Russian military.
When it comes to high oil revenues that have enabled Russia to continue its war effort, however questions over the quality of troops and manufacturing remain. Analysts claim that with the level of manufacturing rate that it is doing better, and the quality of the troops this is the best Russia has. Serious weaknesses continue to be evident in the pipelines in personnel and materiel.
Russia’s military expenditure, for example, has three times increased since the war began. Its share is as high as 40% of its budget and 10% of its GDP is devoted to this conflict. And, yet, spending all these, the Kremlin is not still able to accurately forecast how much it spends on its military budgets since spending frequently gets higher than planned.
State reliance on revenue from oil has cast a blanket over problems in the human capital and the military-industrial complex. The biggest problem in the Russian military-industrial complex is a shortage of skilled labor, together with a limited ability to expand production.
Factories are working triple shifts, six days a week, but still face output limitations based on the amount of machinery and hours used. The inability to augment the workforce with enough skilled manpower and engineers has added to the bottleneck that was caused by the shortage of 400,000 workers and engineers.
Russia has resorted to seeking a weakness by using older models of the tank, such as T-55s, in manufacturing capabilities.
With production no longer seeming capable of increasing, it has turned to Iran and North Korea for missiles and artillery shells, among them, many are duds.
Hard as it may seem, the T-14 Armata with all its purported modernity will likely stay out of combat in Ukraine because it’s too expensive.
Chemezov admitted that the tank is too expensive, and again, the issue here speaks to the problems facing Russia’s military-industrial complex and the prospects for it to be able to sustain a protracted conflict.